

SecOps Strategies & How to Deploy Honeypots into your Kubernetes


21st of March, 2019 | DevOpsPro Europe 2019 / Vilnius / Lithuania kayra.otaner@secops360.com




About Me

Kayra Otaner

- Have been using Linux since 1994,
- Gentoo & Linux From Scratch Fan (#5893)
- Author of first Php & MySQL book written in Turkish published in 2001.
- Chief Architect for Turkish Navy's Open Source Ahtapot (Octopus) Project (<u>www.ahtapot.org.tr</u>)
- Lived in New York City, saw second plane hitting WTC live in September 11.
- Worked as Director of IT Operations in NYC/ mostly in Wall Street, for over 12
 - years.
- Co-Founder and CEO of SecOps360 IT Security and Internet Operations
- Father of two & Devoted Istanbul admirer
- Docker & Security Evangelizer
- https://twitter.com/kayraotaner
- https://www.linkedin.com/in/kayraotaner





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Secops Talks

- June 2016, DevOpsDays Istanbul/Turkey
 Utilizing DevOps for Security Orchestration and Situational Awareness
- April 2017, DevOpsPro Vilnius/Lithuania
 Utilizing Docker to create MicroPerimeter for ZeroTrust Security
- November 2017, DevOpsPro Moscow/Russia
 Security with Docker: HoneyPots as an environment
- March 2019, DevOpsPro Europe Vilnius/Lithuania SecOps Strategies & How to Deploy Honeypots into your Kubernetes





Goals of this talk

- Give you clear understanding of what DevOps and SecOps are.
- Reduce your "Time to Discovery"
- Show you how easy it is to deploy honeypots into environment

Know How vs Know Why

The person who know HOW will always have a job,

The person who knows WHY will always be his boss

Diane Ravitch

Those who know how will always work for those who know why

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
What we will be talking about:

- Time to Discovery
- Zero Trust & MCAP: Micro Core and Perimeter
- DevOps vs SecOps
- Security with Docker
- HoneyPots and Deception Technology
- Stateless Microservices + Stateless Infrastructure



You can't defend.
You can't prevent.
The only thing you can do is detect and respond

Bruce Schneier




Time to Discovery

"Equifax said hackers accessed the information between mid-May and the end of July, when the company discovered the breach."


"Yahoo said it "believes an unauthorised third party, in August 2013, stole data associated with more than one billion user accounts

The breach "is likely distinct from the incident the company disclosed on September 22, 2016".

However, the three-year-old hack was uncovered as part of continuing investigations by authorities and security experts into the 2014 breach, Yahoo said."



2018 Data Breach Investigations Report



53,308 security incidents, 2,216 data breaches, 65 countries, 67 contributors.


Verizon DBIR

https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/dbir/


NSA TAO (Tailored Access Operations)

From their slides:


- We hunt sysadmins
- Know your network, Understand your network (22:00)
- Consider you're already penetrated 29"




Focus on Lateral Movement, remove 'Trusted VLAN'



What if, if we can bring firewall & IDS even closer to the App, and create micro perimeter?






What is DevOps? What is SecOps?

DevOps

Developers love it because it makes their life easier.



Endless Possibilities: DevOps can create an infinite loop of release and feedback for all your code and deployment targets.

DevOps is

(from System Administrator perspective)

Building systems that manages other systems so that I don't need to manage 10000 systems.



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Conventional Environments

Dev: Developer owned environments


Stage: Developer owned environments

QA: QA & Test teams own and use

UAT: User Acceptance Test, for clients use

Preprod: Operations Teams

Prod: Operations Teams



SecOps is:

Building systems that SECURELY builds other systems and keeps them secure so that we don't need to do it using man power.

SecOps

Dev: Developer owned environments

Stage: Developer owned environments


QA: QA & Test teams own and use

UAT: For clients use

Preprod: Operations Teams

Prod: Operations Teams

Honeypots: Security Teams




HoneyPot Environments

Conventional Environments

Stage
Dev
Prod
PreProd
QA

and now

HoneyPots



Change in Skill Set

- By bringing Firewall/IDS/Switch/Hypervisor features closer to the app, we're effectively eliminating needs of having dedicated people to operate them.
- We still need processes to operate functionality required to have secure and stable systems.


APT vs APD

Advanced Persistent Threat vs Advanced Persistent Defense

Cyber Kill Chain


Developed by Lockheed Martin, the Cyber Kill Chain® framework is part of the Intelligence Driven Defense® model for identification and prevention of cyber intrusions activity. The model identifies what the adversaries must complete in order to achieve their objective.

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html



Key Steps

Establish Persistence Lateral Movements



HoneyPots

Gartner Reports

Gartner analyst earlier noted that, "by 2018 ... 10 percent of enterprises will use deception tools and tactics, and actively participate in deception operations against attackers." Gartner also noted deception technology as a "far underutilized technology that can provide serious advantages over attacker

http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3347717

Smarter With Gartner

Why leverage deception?

By 2018, Gartner predicts that 10 percent of enterprises will use decepti actively participate in deception operations against attackers.

More forward-thinking organizations should leverage deception in-depth comprehensive threat defense against the onslaught of advanced attack. This is especially true of larger organizations under constant threat — for financial services, healthcare, government and software verticals.

Intelligence-led deceptions are crucial to disrupting

Threat intelligence sharing continues to provide significant improvement organizations. This threat intelligence data could lead us toward intelligence a threat actor that is known to originate from a certain location, or uses engagement, can be led astray, versus given access to sensitive system types.

This tactic can enable threat management teams to assert more active cactivities throughout the enterprise environment, and allow organization greater intelligence on threat actors. After all, the most critical reason to an attacker and force it to spend more time, causing it economic harm v what is real and what is not, and whether to proceed.

Gartner clients can learn more in "Emerging Technology Analysis: Decel

HoneyPot Ideas?



Once you have the MCAP setup properly, you can either clone your app completely and create a separate dedicated 'honeypot environment' or can create a 'sister environment' that mimics what you might have in your platform


HoneyPot types

- Low interaction
 - Generic protocol emulators, close to 50 protocol emulators are available on the net
- High Interaction
 - Generally specific to your environment, looks and acts like real applications

Low Interaction HoneyPots

Deutsche Telekom sponsors an Open Source low interaction honeypot distro http://dtag-dev-sec.github.io/
Latest version is 18.11
It is a collection of dockerized images of various publicly available honeypots:

- conpot,
- cowrie,
- dionaea,
- elasticpot,
- emobility,
- glastopf,
- honeytrap,
- mailoney,
- rdpy and
- vnclowpot



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High Interaction HoneyPot Ideas?



- 1. Ansible Tower became Open Source: AWX
- 2. MySQL with sample data from your production systems
- 3. SSH dockerized (—net=host) with lots of usernames from your old co-workers ;-)
- 4. Samba/NFS shares with files such as '2019SalaryAndPromtions.xls'
- 5. Syslog servers with real looking events coming through
- 6. Wordpress, Drupal, Joomla or PhpMyAdmin application with a database behind it.

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Blue Print for High Interaction Honeypot

- Nginx
- Php-fpm
- MySQL
- PhpMyAdmin
- Shadowd

analysis.md

PhpMyAdmin HoneyPot with Shadowd running on K8S

Summary

This POC project sets up a honeypot environment exposing a slightly old version of MySQL and PhpMyAdmin. To track malicious activity, it is bundled with Shadowd which needs PostgreSQL, Php Web UI, and Shadowd daemon to function.

Services


Service	Base Image	Ports	Image	Notes			
shadowd_database	postgres:9.6	5432	secops360/shadowd_database	Dockerfile from Shadowd			
shadowd	centos:7.5.1804	9115	secops360/shadowd	Original Dockerfile uses Xenial, I've ported it to Centos:7.5 Link to original Dockerfile			
pma	centos:7.5.1804	80	secops360/pma-honeypot	Centos:7.5 image with nginx, php-fpm and old version of PhpMyAdmin, along with Shadowd connector for honeypot & observing activity. Custom developed just for this POC			
mysqlprod	mysql:5.6	3306	mysql:5.6	Default MySQL docker from hub, with no additional customization. Named 'mysqlprod', in spirit of creating a deception for this honeypot POC			
web	zecure/shadowd_ui	80	zecure/shadowd_ui	Used default image from the docker hub. Initially wanted to port this to Centos:7.5 however resolving Php composer dependencies took a lot of time and skipped this part. Plan is to port this one to Centos:7 as well			


Steps


1. Create docker images


```
nohut:k8s kayra$ kubectl create -f ./yml
deployment.extensions "mysqlprod" created
service "mysqlprod" created
deployment.extensions "pma" created
persistentvolumeclaim "shadowd-db-claim0" created
deployment.extensions "shadowd-db" created
service "shadowd-db" created
deployment.extensions "shadowd" created
service "shadowd" created
deployment.extensions "shadowd" created
service "shadowd" created
service "shadowd" created
service "web" created
```

nohut:k8s kayra\$ kubectl get pods				
NAME	READY	STATUS	RESTARTS	AGE
mysqlprod-db894c7fd-5hlbj	1/1	Running	O	2 m
pma-7dcf498b44-w7dwt	1/1	Running	O	2 m
shadowd-6f74d7b9f9-4vgl4	1/1	Running	O	2 m
shadowd-db-6656fc6cf-k47dd	1/1	Running	O	2 m
web-857b7cc4d8-vlq45	1/1	Running	1	2 m












▲ Request ID		Profile ID		Date	Caller		Resource		Client IP		Overview	# Parameters	
12	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/version_check.php	00	/version_check.php?server=1&token=0d9e3c7c249081f9	00	172.17.0.1	00		17	Q
11	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/index.php		/		172.17.0.1	00		14	Q
10	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/navigation.php		/navigation.php?ajax_request=1&token=0d9e3c7c24908		172.17.0.1			24	Q
9	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/js/get_scripts.js.php		/js/get_scripts.js.php?scripts[]=db_structure.js&s		172.17.0.1			16	Q
8	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/db_structure.php	00	/db_structure.php?server=1&db=mysql&token=0d9e3c7c		172.17.0.1	00		21	Q
7	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/version_check.php	00	/version_check.php?server=1&token=0d9e3c7c249081f9	00	172.17.0.1	00		17	Q
6	00	1 (pma-honeypot)		2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/phpmyadmin.css.php		/phpmyadmin.css.php?server=1&token=0d9e3c7c249081f		172.17.0.1			16	Q
5	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/js/messages.php	00	/js/messages.php?lang=en&db=&token=0d9e3c7c249081f	00	172.17.0.1	00		16	Q
4	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/js/get_scripts.js.php	00	/js/get_scripts.js.php?scripts[]=jquery/jquery-1.8	00	172.17.0.1	00		23	Q
3	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/js/whitelist.php	00	/js/whitelist.php?lang=en&db=&token=0d9e3c7c249081	00	172.17.0.1	00		16	Q
2	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/js/get_scripts.js.php	00	/js/get_scripts.js.php?scripts[]=jquery/jquery.deb	00	172.17.0.1	00		23	Q
1	00	1 (pma-honeypot)	00	2018-11-04 16:26	/opt/pma/index.php	00	/	00	172.17.0.1	00		14	Q

Delete requests **♦** Execute


Shadow Daemon -- Web Application Firewall © 2014-2018 by Hendrik Buchwald

Head of International Cyber Security Team, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

We estimate that 80% of successful attacks could be defeated by simple best practice.



Is applying best practices good enough for your environment?





Those who know do,
Those who understand, teach

Aristotle

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